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ABSTRACT
The Default Interventionist account suggests that by default, we often gener-
ate belief-based responses when reasoning and find it difficult to draw the
logical inference. Recent research, however, shows that in some instances
belief judgments take longer, are more prone to error and are more affected
by cognitive load. One interpretation is that some logical inferences are avail-
able automatically and require intervention in order to respond according to
beliefs. In two experiments, we investigate the effortful nature of belief judg-
ments and the automaticity of logical inferences by increasing the inhibitory
demands of the task. Participants were instructed to judge conclusion validity,
believability and either font colour or font style, to increase the number of
competing responses. Results showed that conflict more strongly affects judg-
ments of believability than validity and when inhibitory demands are
increased, the validity of an argument impacts more on belief judgments.
These findings align with the new Parallel Processing model of belief bias.
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A dominant view of human reasoning is that our thinking is beset by error
and bias and that logical thought can only be accomplished through delib-
erative and effortful processing. According to this view, our beliefs often
have a profound impact on our capacity to reason logically, providing
powerful, pre-emptive cues to a solution that comes to mind rapidly and
requires effort to resist in favour of more considered responding. The psy-
chological study of belief bias in reasoning has contributed much to this
model of thinking and a dual-process account that has dominated both the
academic (Evans, 2007, 2008, 2010b) and popular scientific literatures dur-
ing the last decade (Evans, 2010a; Kahneman, 2011).
Typical studies of belief bias involve presenting participants with reason-
ing problems in which there is a conflict between the believability of the
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conclusion and its logical status. Consider, for example, the follow-
ing problem:
All humans are organisms
All organisms are made of plastic
Therefore, all humans are made of plastic.
Participants are usually asked to assume the premises are true and to
evaluate whether the conclusion logically follows. In this case, the argu-
ment is valid, but the conclusion is unbelievable. Generally, people find this
type of “conflict” problem more difficult than logically equivalent problems
where there is no such conflict, presumably because a belief- based
response must be resisted prior to a logical judgment being realised. This
type of explanation for the differential difficulty of problem types is cap-
tured by Default Interventionist (DI) Dual Process Accounts of thinking (see,
for example, Evans & Stanovich, 2013). Such accounts define two types of
process; fast, implicit, default type-1 processes which often deliver
responses based on beliefs or learned associations; and type-2 processes
which are characteristically slower, explicit by nature and draw upon work-
ing memory (WM) or executive processes. Controlled processing is required
to inhibit responses based upon type-1 processes and provide the cognitive
resources to reason logically. However, a number of authors have argued
that humans have an inclination towards “miserly” processing (Toplak, West
& Stanovich, 2011) and given the cognitive effort required to inhibit a
belief-based response (Handley, Capon, Beveridge, Dennis & Evans, 2004),
we are often inclined to default to type-1 processing due to its low compu-
tational expense (Toplak, West & Stanovich, 2014).
There is some support for the claim that belief-based errors reflect super-
ficial, default processing whereas logical responding depends upon more
effortful reflection. De Neys (2006), for example, used a secondary task to
load working memory while participants completed syllogistic reasoning
problems in which logic and belief-based responses diverged. He showed
that a working memory load impacted accuracy on conflict items, but not
on items where there was no-conflict between logic and belief. The findings
suggest, in line with DI accounts, that cognitive resources are required to
resist default responses and reason logically. Similarly, when participants
are given limited time to respond, belief-based responses are increased on
syllogistic reasoning tasks (Evans & Curtis-Holmes, 2005) and more invalid
inferences are drawn on conditional inference tasks (Schroyens, Schaeken &
Handley, 2003). Studies of individual differences have shown that logical
accuracy on tasks in which there are competing heuristic and normative
responses is associated with variations in cognitive ability and rational
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thinking dispositions (Stanovich, 1999). These correlations are assumed to
arise because they index variations in the capacity to engage in inhibitory
processes which are required to resist the lure of a compelling and highly
available heuristic response (Stanovich & West, 2008). This has been identi-
fied as the central feature of type-2 processing necessary for hypothetical
thinking (Evans, 2007).
Default Interventionist accounts assume that belief-based responses are
available early and the logical response requires further deliberative proc-
essing. Recent research, however, offers evidence of fast (and slow) process-
ing for both rule-based and belief-based reasoning (Newman, Gibb &
Thompson, 2017). Furthermore, reasoners are aware of early conflict even
when a biased response is generated. De Neys (2012) has argued that indi-
viduals automatically detect logic-belief conflict, even when the conflict is
resolved in favour of belief-based responding. Conflict problems lead to
increased processing latencies compared to non-conflict problems (Stupple
& Ball, 2008) and are associated with lower levels of reported confidence
(De Neys, Cromheeke & Osman, 2011). Bago and De Neys (2017) further
supported this claim by testing the time course assumption of the Default
Interventionist account, using a two-response paradigm requiring immedi-
ate and delayed responding to base rate and syllogistic reasoning prob-
lems. They found that reasoners showed a high prevalence of logical
responses to conflict problems even under immediate responding condi-
tions and accompanying load, consistent with an intuitive route to logical
responding. Participants were also less confident in the accuracy of their
answers under these conditions suggesting the simultaneous and intuitive
generation of both logical and heuristic (belief-based) responding.
The detection of conflict is also reflected in neurophysiological measure-
ment, whereby the processing of conflict problems is associated with
increased skin conductance and activation of the Anterior Cingulate Cortex
(De Neys, Moyens & Vansteenwegen, 2010). Interestingly, the detection of
conflict is not influenced by secondary tasks or cognitive capacity as one
might expect if the logical processing involved depended upon explicit
deliberative reasoning (De Neys et al., 2010, 2011; De Neys &
Glumicic, 2008).
Recent research suggests that intuitive sensitivity to logical structure
arises because logical arguments are more fluent; that is, it is easier to inte-
grate the premises of a logically valid argument than one that is not
(Morsanyi & Handley, 2012). Increased fluency is thought to lead to
increased positive affect which has been shown to result in higher ratings
of liking for valid than invalid arguments (Morsanyi & Handley, 2012;
Trippas, Handley, Verde & Morsanyi, 2016). Most recently, it has been shown
that the conclusions of valid arguments are judged to be brighter on a
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perceptual judgment task, presumably because a feeling of positive affect
is misattributed to the perceptual features of a valid conclusion that follows
fluently from its premises (Trippas et al. 2016).
How might we reconcile the apparent evidence for effortful processing
in the resolution of belief-logic conflict and the mounting evidence for
intuitive detection of logical structure? A key feature of studies that provide
support for the DI account is that in all cases participants are instructed
explicitly to reason logically. That is, they are instructed to consider what
logically follows from a set of premises independent of their belief state.
One possibility is that responding to instructions where there is a conflict
between the instructional requirement and beliefs draws upon cognitive
resources, so although a logical response may be available intuitively, any
available response must be validated against the task requirements. The
nature of the instructions provided has been the focus of a number of
recent studies in which participants were instructed to either judge the
logical validity of a presented conclusion or its believability (Handley,
Newstead & Trippas, 2011). Handley, Newstead, and Trippas (2011) adapted
the typical belief-bias paradigm by asking participants to judge both the
validity and the believability of an argument. Contrary to predictions
derived from the DI account, belief judgments took longer and were more
subject to error than judgments of logical validity, and belief-logic conflict
had a greater impact on the accuracy of belief than logic judgments. They
concluded that the logical inference was available early and had to be
inhibited in order to explicitly evaluate a conclusion’s believability. One pos-
sible interpretation of these findings is that the logical inference is available
automatically and by default and intervention is required to successfully
give a belief judgment. Howarth, Handley, and Walsh (2016) tested this
account by examining the impact of a secondary task (Random Number
Generation) on both belief- and logic-based judgments while completing
both simple (Modus Ponens) and more complex (Disjunctions) reasoning
problems. The results replicated earlier findings showing that belief-based
judgments produced lower rates of accuracy overall and were influenced to
a greater extent than validity judgments by the presence of a conflict
between belief and logic for both simple and complex arguments.
However, the secondary task, while reducing accuracy of judgments overall,
had its greatest impact on logic-based judgments. Howarth et al. (2016)
interpreted their findings as a conflict between two type-2 processes. They
propose that logical responses are available at an early type-1 level, yet
require type-2 processing in order to explicitly extract the underlying struc-
ture of an argument required for delivering a response based on the valid-
ity of the inference. Belief-based responses, on the other hand, are available
later and effective responding depends upon the inhibition of an accessible
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and competing intuitive logical response. This interpretation is consistent
with the parallel processing model introduced by Handley and Trippas
(2015) as illustrated in Figure 1.
This model suggests that both structural features and knowledge of
problem content can be triggered concurrently. Both can demand type-1
and type-2 processing; likewise, both are prone to errors and biased
responses. Notably, one of the key characteristics of this model is that the
direction of interference between knowledge based and structural process-
ing will depend upon the complexity of the logical argument, such that
simple problems may cue type 1, logical responses early which will require
inhibiting in order to produce a knowledge-based output.
Howarth et al. (2016) argued that both belief- and logic-based judgments
depend upon type-1 and type-2 processes, where interference can occur bi-
directionally at the type-2 stage or type-1 stage of processing which accounts
for the evidence of intuitive detection of conflict and the impact of conflict
under explicit instruction. This model has subsequently received support
from evidence which shows that the direction of the impact of conflict on
logic and belief judgments depends upon the complexity of the logical task
(Trippas, Thompson & Handley, 2017). With more complex logical arguments,
such as multiple model syllogisms, conflict leads to reduced logical perform-
ance and has a limited effect on belief judgments, but the reverse holds with
simpler logical structures, such as conditional or disjunctive arguments.
These findings align with the substantial evidence for belief bias in the litera-
ture and for the idea that this varies as a function of inhibitory capacity
(Handley et al., 2004; De Neys & Franssens, 2009).
Figure 1. The parallel competitive (PC) dual-process model where processing time is
represented on the right to left dimension, the vertical line indicates the point where
conflict might be detected and also the transition between type-1 and type-2 proc-
essing. For simple logical problems, a response based upon logical structure is avail-
able first and must be inhibited in order to respond on the basis of beliefs.
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The primary aim of this article is to investigate the effortful nature of
belief-based judgments in line with the model detailed in Figure 1. If a sim-
ple logical inference is available early, then the ability to respond on the
basis of belief would require the inhibition of the readily available logical
response. One way to investigate this account is to increase the inhibitory
demands of the task. This was achieved by increasing the number of available
competing responses on the task through the introduction of a third instruc-
tional condition. Our parallel competitive model predicts that for simple
logical problems, an inhibitory load will increase the difficulty of withholding
a logical response and will therefore reduce accuracy on the belief judgments.
Experiment 1
In Experiment 1, we presented conflict and no-conflict problems under
three competing instructional conditions. Participants responded based
upon instructional cues that required judgments of conclusion validity, con-
clusion believability, or the font colour of the final word of the conclusion.
Consider, for example, the following problem:
If the fruit is a strawberry, then it is purple
Suppose the fruit is a strawberry
Does it follow that the fruit is red?





In the Stroop condition, on belief/logic conflict trials, there was a mis-
match between the meaning of the final word and its colour, where the
automatic inclination to respond based on the written word is inconsistent
with the colour of the ink (Stroop, 1935). This mismatch was designed to
increase the inhibitory demands of the task and create a Stroop effect in
the Stroop condition, a feature that was not present in the control condi-
tion, for example:
Either blood is red or white
Suppose the blood is not white
Does it follow that blood is red?
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We predicted that the introduction of an additional demanding instruc-




A total of 112 psychology undergraduate students from Plymouth
University took part in Experiment 1, in exchange for two course credits.
Ninety-two women and 20 men participated in the experiment and were
randomly assigned to either the Control or the Stroop condition.
Design
A 3(Instruction) 2(Problem Type) 2(Complexity) 2(Condition) mixed
design with repeated measures on the first three factors, required partici-
pants to judge the validity or believability of the conclusion or the font col-
our of the last word in the conclusion, creating three instructional sets.
Participants were presented with both conflict and no-conflict problem
types, which refers to the conflict between a belief and a logical response.
The complexity of the argument refers to the simple Modus Ponens form or
the more complex Disjunctive form and condition refers to the Stroop or
Control group as the between subject factor.
Materials
A set of 192 logical arguments were created for Experiment 1. As in previ-
ous work (Howarth et al. 2016), there were an equal number of Modus
Ponens and Disjunctive arguments. Half the problems were conflict prob-
lems (belief and logic conflicted) and half were no-conflict problems (belief
and logic matched).
The third instructional cue was principally introduced to create the
Stroop condition which would increase the inhibitory demands of the rea-
soning task and allow us to measure the impact this would have on belief
and logic judgments. To achieve this, the third instruction was an adapta-
tion of the Stroop task, which involved colour naming of a concluding
word. In the Stroop condition, under colour naming instruction, the trials
were a mix of congruent and incongruent trials. This condition was
designed to reflect the original design of the Stroop task where there are a
mix of congruent and incongruent trials. This increases inhibitory demands
because individuals are unaware from trial to trial whether the colour word
and ink colour will be in conflict with one another or not. For incongruent
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trials, there was a mismatch between the ink colour and the written word.
For congruent trials, the ink colour and word matched (Table 1). In the con-
trol condition, participants were also presented with the colour naming
task; however, all the trials were congruent.
In both the Stroop and control conditions, participants were also pre-
sented with belief and logic problems; and, from trial to trial, would not
know how to respond until presented with response options. When
required to make a belief judgement, participants were presented with
“believable” or “unbelievable” as response options, when required to
answer according to logic, they were presented with “valid” or “invalid”
response options.
In the control condition, the correct response always matched the font
colour and the written word on every trial.
Since we were interested in the impact of conflict on belief and logic
judgments, we ensured that the incongruent colour naming trials (colour
mismatch) were also conflict problems (conflict between belief and logic)
and hypothesised that the embedded colour incongruence would increase
inhibitory demands for conflict problems under belief and logic instruction.
In the control condition, there was a match between the word and colour
ensuring no increased inhibitory demands on conflict problems.
Procedure
Participants were tested in groups of up to four (maximum) individuals in
partitioned booths and were randomly assigned to the Stroop or Control
condition. In both conditions, each participant was presented with 192
problems with an optional respite at the half way point. The experiment
was administered through a computer-based E-prime programme.
Participants were first required to answer 12 practice trials before being
Table 1. Examples of response options for each instructional cue with conflict and
no-conflict items in the Experimental condition.
Instructional cue No-conflict problems Conflict problems
If the fruit is a strawberry, then
it is red Suppose fruit is a
strawberry Does it follow that
the fruit is red?
If the fruit is a strawberry, then
it is purple Suppose fruit is a
strawberry Does it follow that
the fruit is red?
Either flamingos are pink or they
are purple Suppose flamingos
are not purple Does it follow
that flamingos are pink?
Either flamingos are pink or they
are purple Suppose flamingos
are not pink Does it follow
that flamingos are not purple?
Colour naming – MP Red or Purple Purple or Red
Colour naming - Disjunctive Pink or Purple Pink or Purple
Belief Believable or Unbelievable Believable or Unbelievable
Logic Valid or Invalid Valid or Invalid
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presented with the experimental trials in an unblocked design. The ran-
domisation of the trials ensured that participants would remain unaware as
to whether they would need to answer according to logic, beliefs or the
font colour of the last word, until the response options were presented. For
each problem, the first premise was presented alone on the computer
screen for a total of 3,000ms. It remained on the screen and was followed
by the second premise, conclusion, and response options, which were all
presented together. The full problem stayed on the screen until the partici-
pant pressed their response key on the keyboard. Both accuracy scores and
latencies were recorded for each trial.
Results
Prior to analysing the data, we adopted the same procedure as Handley,
Newstead, & Trippas (2011; see also Howarth et al., 2016) and eliminated
participants that scored below 50% on conflict items under both belief and
logic instruction as this indicates a failure to engage with the instructions.
A total of 16 participants were eliminated, three from the Stroop condition
(N¼ 50) and 13 from the Control condition (N¼ 46).
From Tables 2 and 3, accuracy on colour naming trials and no-conflict
belief and logic trials was near ceiling. Ceiling effects can have a significant
impact on homogeneity of variance resulting in higher rates of skewness
and kurtosis across conditions. The normality of the data was initially
checked on non-transformed data, across both conflict and non-conflict
Table 2. Average accuracy and latency scores on conflict and no-conflict items,








89(.01) 98(.01) 99(.01) 100(.01) 97(.01)




99(.01) 97(.01) 98(.01) 97(.01) 98(.01)








3542(117) 3386(125) 3762(122) 3623(115)
Results exclude below chance scores and include correct only latencies. Stroop condition (N¼ 50),
Control condition (N¼ 46).
Note: standard error in brackets.
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problems for belief and logic instructions, by examining measures of skew-
ness and kurtosis for each cell of the design.
Prior to transformation, the z scores across conditions ranged between
6.0 and 8.9 for skewness and between 2.6 and 10.3 for kurtosis, as one
might expect given the observed ceiling effects in certain cells. To control
for the ceiling effects associated with these high accuracy rates, particularly
on no-conflict problems, an arcsine transformation was carried out to
improve homogeneity of variance (Milligan, 1987). The arcsine transform-
ation brought the z-scores closer to normal range [within ±2.58, see Hair,
Black, Babin, Anderson & Tatham, 2006; Mat Roni, 2014) with skewness
reduced to a range between 0.5 and 3.7 and kurtosis ranging between
0.01 and 2.00. Although the transformation did not completely eliminate
skewness, it created a more homogenous data set on which to perform the
analysis of variance. This choice of transformation was in keeping with pre-
vious work (Handley et al. 2011; Howarth et al. 2016). On the latency data,
the analysis was conducted on correct responses where outliers more than
two standard deviations from the mean of each cell were eliminated and
any missing data were replaced with the overall cell mean, which
accounted for no more than 5.5% of the overall data. Latencies and accur-
acy scores are presented in the tables prior to transformation.
We separate out the analysis and start with the colour naming instruc-
tion to determine (1) whether we had created the desired Stroop effect in
the Stroop condition and that this condition was sufficiently more demand-
ing than the control condition and (2) whether a colour mismatch (incon-
gruent trials) resulted in less accuracy than colour match (congruent) trials.
Then, we carry out separate analyses on belief and logic instruction in order
to determine whether the difference between inhibitory demanding and
less demanding conditions differentially impacted on belief and logic judg-
ments and evaluated problem conflict through accuracy and latency data.
Colour- naming instruction
A problem type (Conflict/No-conflict) by complexity (MP/Disjunctives) by
experimental condition (Stroop/Control) mixed design ANOVA was carried
out on Arcsine transformed accuracy data under colour-naming instruction
(Table 2). Problem type indicates whether a conflict or no-conflict problem
accompanies a colour-naming trial. Recall that the control condition only
included congruent trials whilst the Stroop condition contained a mix of
congruent and incongruent trials. The incongruent trials always accompa-
nied conflict problems.
The results revealed a main effect of problem type (Conflict/No-conflict);
F(1, 94)¼ 37.066, p< .001, g2p ¼ .283, with colour naming trials accompany-
ing conflict problems producing lower accuracy scores than those
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accompanying no-conflict problems (96% vs. 99%) and a main effect of con-
dition; F(2, 94)¼ 5.845, p¼ .018, g2p ¼ .059, which highlighted poorer per-
formance in the Stroop condition, substantiated by a significant interaction
between problem type and condition; F(1, 94)¼ 54.942, p <.001, g2p ¼ .369.
Separate analyses revealed that the main effect of problem type was only
present in the Stroop condition; F(1, 49)¼ 93.371, p< .001, g2p ¼ .656,
showing poorer performance on colour-naming trials accompanying con-
flict problems compared to no-conflict problems (94% vs. 100%). This dem-
onstrates that the presence of a colour mismatch on conflict problems in
the Stroop condition leads to reduced accuracy, confirming the presence of
increased inhibitory demands and the desired Stroop effect.
There was also a significant main effect of complexity (Disjunctives/MP);
F(1, 94)¼ 34.873, p< .001, g2p ¼ .271, showing lower accuracy scores on col-
our-naming trials accompanying MP arguments compared to disjunctives
arguments (96% vs. 99%). Although the difference is small, the effect sug-
gests that trials where the inference is accomplished rapidly (MP) interferes
with the capacity to correctly name the colour of the last word. This signifi-
cant effect of complexity also interacted with condition; F(1, 94)¼ 115.982,
p <.001,g2p ¼ .552. Furthermore, the 3-way interaction between problem
type, complexity and condition; F(1, 94)¼ 69.692, p< .001, g2p ¼ .426, was
Figure 2. An illustration of the differential impact of conflict on MP and Disjunctives
arguments under each condition. Error bars represent the SEM.
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driven by the significantly larger interaction between problem and complex-
ity for the Stroop condition; F(1, 49)¼ 106.408, p< .001, g2p ¼ .685, com-
pared to the control condition; F(1, 45)¼ 5.447, p¼ .024, g2p ¼ .108 (see
Figure 2).
The results revealed that conflict had a bigger effect on colour-naming
trials accompanying MP arguments (99% no-conflict vs. 89% conflict) com-
pared to those accompanying disjunctives arguments (100% no-conflict vs.
98% conflict) in the Stroop condition. In the control condition, there was no
effect of conflict on disjunctive judgments (97% no-conflict vs. 97% conflict)
or MP judgments (98% no-conflict vs. 99% conflict), under colour-naming
instruction. Suggesting that when you have incongruent inhibitory
demanding trials, colour naming is more difficult, particularly when it is a
readily available inference (MP).
The latency data for colour-naming instruction produced a main effect
of problem type; F(1, 94)¼ 7.145, p¼ .009, g2p ¼ .071, with colour-naming
trials accompanying no-conflict problems taking longer than conflict prob-
lems (3,692ms vs. 3,464ms). This could be due to the fact that no-conflict
problems strongly cue a response that is compatible with both belief and
logic, and therefore, it takes longer to shift to a response based on colour.
There was a main effect of condition; F(2, 94)¼ 27.137, p< .001, g2p ¼ .224,
indicating that overall, performance in the Stroop condition was signifi-
cantly slower than the control condition (4,116ms vs. 3,041ms), consistent
with the Stroop condition being more demanding on inhibition. Finally,
there was a small main effect of complexity; F(1, 94)¼ 5.400, p¼ .022, g2p ¼
.054, showing that under colour-naming instruction arguments presented
as MP took slightly longer than those presented as disjunctives (3,652ms
vs. 3,504ms).
Belief and logic instruction
Separating out the analysis on colour-naming items allowed us to show
that the Stroop manipulation was effective in increasing performance
demands in the experimental (Stroop) condition. Next, we examine the
experimental manipulation on belief and logic instruction, given that the
form and content of the arguments are critical features in determining
responses under these conditions. We report analysis on both subjects and
items in order to ensure that all the effects are robust across the range of
contents used and that subject effects are not linked to a particular set of
items in the reasoning task.
The presence of a subject’s effect in the absence of an items effect sug-
gests that the finding is not generalisable across the full item set. An items
effect in the absence of a subject’s effect suggest that the finding is not
generalisable across the full subject sample. The observation of an effect
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that holds across subjects and items indicates a robust finding that is not
dependent upon specific item contents or on specific participant subsets.
We consequently only follow up effects of this kind that allow some
generalisability.
The analysis is presented as F1(subjects) and F2(items) and the accuracy
data were analysed using a 2(Belief/Logic) 2(Conflict/No-conflict) 2(MP/
Disjunctives) 2(Stroop condition/Control condition) mixed design ANOVA
on Arcsine transformed data (Table 3). The analysis showed a main effect of
instruction (Belief/Logic) for subjects, F1 (1, 94)¼ 22.637, p< .001, g2p ¼ .194;
and items, F2(1, 120)¼ 11.749, p¼ .001, g2p ¼ .089, with logic judgments
generating higher accuracy scores compared to belief judgments (93% vs.
89%). There was a main effect of problem type (Conflict/No-Conflict) for sub-
jects, F1 (1, 94)¼ 56.043, p< .001, g2p ¼ .374; and items, F2(1, 120)¼ 37.594,
p< .001, g2p ¼ .239, with poorer performance on conflict items compared
to no-conflict items (88% vs. 94%). There was a main effect of complexity
(Disjunctives/MP) for subjects, F1 1, 94)¼ 50.773, p< .001, g2p ¼ .351; and
items, F2(1, 120)¼ 31.355, p< .001, g2p ¼ .207, where MP produced higher
accuracy scores than disjunctive judgments (94% vs. 88%), but there was no
main effect of condition for subjects, F1(2, 94)¼ .010, p ¼.919, g2p < .001; or
Figure 3. An illustration of the differential impact conflict has on belief and logic
judgments in each condition. Error bars represent the SEM.
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items, F1(1, 120)¼ .257, p¼ .613, g2p ¼ .002, showing that performance
between the Stroop and control condition was not significantly different
(91% vs. 91%).
There was a significant interaction between instruction and problem type
for subjects, F1(1, 94)¼ 8.467, p¼ .004, g2p ¼ .083; and items, F2(1,
120)¼ 6.994, p¼ .009, g2p ¼ .055, revealing that the belief/logic conflict had
more of an impact on judgments of the conclusions believability (85% B-
conflict vs. 94% B-no-conflict) than its logical validity (91% L-conflict vs. 95%
L-no-conflict). There was also a marginal 3-way interaction between instruc-
tion, problem type and condition for subjects, F1(2, 94)¼ 3.710, p¼ .057,
g2p ¼ .038; and a significant interaction for items, F2(1, 120)¼ 20.516,
p< .001, g2p ¼ .146. (Figure 3).
A follow-up analysis on both conditions revealed that the interaction
between instruction and problem was present in the Stroop condition for
subjects, F1(1, 49)¼ 8.871, p¼ .004, g2p ¼ .153; and items, F2(1,
120)¼ 19.384, p< .001, g2p ¼ .139, but absent in the control condition for
both subjects, F1(1, 45) ¼.789, p¼ .379, g2p ¼ .017; and items, F2(1, 120)
¼.223, p¼ .637, g2p ¼ .002. This demonstrated that the effect of conflict was
enhanced for belief instruction (82% conflict vs. 94% no-conflict) compared
to logic instruction (92% conflict vs. 94% no-conflict) in the Stroop condition.
In the control condition, the effect of conflict was comparable between
belief instruction (86% conflict vs. 94% no-conflict) and logic instruction
(89% conflict vs. 96% no-conflict). A significant interaction between problem
type and complexity for subjects, F1(1, 94)¼ 17.322, p< .001, g2p ¼ .156, sug-
gested that the impact of conflict was larger for MP judgments (89% conflict
vs. 97% no-conflict) than disjunctives (86% conflict vs. 91% no-conflict) (Table
3). However, this interaction was not significant in the items analysis; F2(1,
120)¼ 2.271, p¼ .134, g2p ¼ .019. Finally, there was a 3-way interaction
between instruction, problem and complexity for subjects, F1(1, 94)¼ 6.131
p¼ .015, g2p ¼ .061; however, the interaction was not significant for the
items analysis, F2(1, 120)¼ 1.070, p¼ .303, g2p ¼ .009.
A mixed design ANOVA on response latencies, produced no main effect
of instruction for both subjects, F1(1, 94)¼ 2.150, p¼ .146, g2p ¼ .022; and
items, F2(1, 120)¼ .027, p¼ .870, g2p < .001, revealing no significant differ-
ence in latencies between belief (5,807ms) and logic (5,933ms) instruction.
There was, however, a main effect of problem type for subjects, F1(1,
94)¼ 34.661 p< .001, g2p ¼ .26; and items, F2(1, 120)¼ 5.879, p¼ .017, g2p ¼
.047, with conflict items taking longer to complete than no-conflict items
(6,140ms vs. 5,600ms) and a main effect of complexity for subjects, F1(1,
94)¼ 38.171, p< .001, g2p ¼ .289; and items, F2(1, 120)¼ 8.895, p¼ .003,
g2p ¼ .069, indicating faster response latencies to MP judgments compared
to disjunctive judgments (5,626ms vs. 6,114ms). The interaction between
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complexity and condition for subjects, F1(1, 94)¼ 6.329, p¼ .014, g2p ¼ .063;
and items, F2(1, 120)¼ 5.048, p¼ .026, g2p ¼ .040, suggested that there was
bigger effect of condition on MP latencies (5,428ms control vs. 5,823ms
Stroop), compared to the latencies on disjunctive judgments (6,115ms con-
trol vs. 6,112ms Stroop). The effect of experimental condition was not signifi-
cant in the subject’s analysis, F1(2, 94)¼ .359, p¼ .550, g2p ¼ .004; but was
for the item’s analysis, F2(1, 120)¼ 16.339, p< .001, g2p ¼ .120, with items in
the Stroop condition taking longer to complete (5,772ms control vs.
5,968ms Stroop).
Lastly, there was a significant 3-way interaction between instruction,
problem type and condition in the subject’s analysis, F1(1, 94)¼ 7.290,
p¼ .008, g2p ¼ .072; which was not significant for the item’s analysis, F2(1,
120)¼ 2.404, p¼ .124, g2p ¼ .020.
Discussion
In Experiment 1, we asked participants to evaluate the validity or believabil-
ity of a given conclusion on simple (MP) and complex (disjunctives) items,
whilst introducing a third instructional colour-naming condition designed
to increase the inhibitory demands of the task and allow us to evaluate the
role of inhibition in the effect of conflict on belief-based judgments. We
conjectured that an increase in inhibitory demands would have its greatest
impact on belief judgments; in line with this prediction the findings demon-
strated that the effect of conflict increased under belief instruction in the
Stroop condition. In other words, logic judgments appeared to impact on
belief judgments more when inhibitory demands were increased by the
inclusion of an arduous, third instructional cue.
Importantly, the experiment also clearly replicated earlier findings by
Howarth et al. (2016) demonstrating that belief judgments are more prone
to errors, conflict problems produce lower accuracy scores and MP judg-
ments produce high accuracy scores. Furthermore, results reproduced the
now familiar finding where belief-logic conflict impacts more on the believ-
ability of the conclusion for both accuracy and latency scores (Handley
et al., 2011; Howarth et al., 2016). In addition, the items analysis showed
that the effects on instruction can be extended beyond the present sample
and beyond the present set of items.
The current findings lend support to the parallel processing model out-
lined in Figure 1. According to the model, simple logical inferences are
available early and require inhibiting in order to produce a belief-based
output. Limiting the capacity to inhibit the early completion of a logical
response, by the inclusion of an additional instructional cue, should have its
greatest impact on belief judgments, as confirmed in Experiment 1.
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However, while the findings suggest that belief judgments are more effort-
ful when the number of competing responses are increased; the Stroop
design appears to have a more impact on the length of time taken to com-
plete logic-conflict items (6501ms) compared to belief-conflict items
(6072ms). We will consider the reason why this is the case in more detail in
the general discussion but in short, we conjecture that this can be
explained in terms of there being “Two Routes” to a logical output. One
route is an independent type-1 process completing first and creating an
intuitive cue, possibly accompanied by a feeling of rightness (Thompson,
Prowse Turner & Pennycook, 2011), based on the logical structure of the
argument. This output is what requires inhibiting and causes a type-1/type-
2 conflict when instructed to reason on the basis of beliefs. The second
route to a logical solution is a type-2 process, activated when given explicit
instructions to reason logically, that runs parallel to the route required for a
belief-based response. In Experiment 1, the second route may be impacted
by the increased inhibitory demands created by the third instructional cue
which interferes with the length of time it takes for a logical output to com-
plete. However, these logical inferences are still simple and are therefore
less prone to error than belief-based judgments.
At this point, we consider two possible explanations for the increased
inhibitory demands associated with the Stroop condition: (1) due to the
nature of the Stroop instruction and the requirement to inhibit semantic
processing in favour of colour-naming or (2) because the presence of a
third instructional condition with significant processing demands increases
the number of competing and effortful responses, thus enhancing the
inhibitory demands of the task. In order to discriminate between these two
explanations, in Experiment 2, we introduced a third instructional condition
in which the cue directly taxes on WM (n-back) as opposed to inhibition. If
the observed findings are the result of competing responses created by an
additional instructional cue, then we can expect to see an impact of the n-
back task on belief judgments.
Experiment 2
The aim of the second experiment was to determine whether the nature of
the processing demands of the third instructional condition was respon-
sible for the findings in Experiment 1. In Experiment 2, we examined the
function of memory updating in relation to logic and belief-based judg-
ments. Memory updating is the executive function that monitors incoming
information for its magnitude and appropriateness, and updates the infor-
mation in WM by exchanging old items for new (Morris & Jones, 1990). In
the current experiment, the colour-naming instructional condition is
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replaced with n-back instructions which involve the identification of fea-
tures presented in a previous trial (see design and materials sections). The
n-back (Kirchner, 1958) is a performance task requiring continuous main-
taining, updating, and releasing of arbitrary bindings between items and
temporal order positions (Friedman et al. 2006). The third instructional cue
in the current experiment is designed so participants are unable to predict
whether they will be required to make a judgment based on believability,
validity or recall the features in the preceding trial. Unlike the colour-nam-
ing task, the n-back manipulation should not draw directly on inhibitory
resources. Therefore, if the findings in Experiment 1 are a result of the spe-
cific inhibitory demands of the colour-naming instruction then any impact
on belief judgments should be eliminated. However, if the effects arise
because of the presence of an additional effortful competing response
option, then we would expect to replicate the findings of Experiment 1.
Method
Participants
A total of 79 Psychology undergraduate students from Plymouth University
took part in the current study, in exchange for course credits or £8 pay-
ment. Fifty-nine females and 20 male participants were randomly assigned
to either the Experimental (memory updating) or Control condi-
tion (matching).
Design
As in Experiment 1, a 3(instruction) 2(Problem Type) 2(Complexity)
 2(Condition) mixed design was used with repeated measures on the first
three factors. Participants were instructed to make judgments on the valid-
ity or believability of a conclusion or on the font style of the last word in
the previous trial, creating the three instructional sets. Again, participants
were presented with both conflict and no-conflict problems (problem type)
in the form of MP and disjunctive arguments (complexity) in either the
Experimental or Control group (condition) as the between subject factor.
Materials
The same 192 arguments used in Experiment 1 were used for Experiment 2
with the 64 colour-naming trials exchanged for 64 n-back trials in the
experimental condition and 64 matching trials in the control condition. The
allocation of items to participants was carried out in the same way as
Experiment 1, where half of the 192 items were conflict problems (belief
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and logic conflicted) and half were no-conflict problems (belief and logic
matched). Of the conflict items, half had valid/unbelievable conclusions and
the other half were invalid/believable. Of the no-conflict items, half had
valid/believable conclusions, and the other half had invalid/unbelievable
conclusions to ensure the equal distribution of yes/no responses under
each instructional condition. Finally, half of the items were disjunctive argu-
ments and half Modus Ponens arguments.
In the experimental condition, the n-back trials were created by chang-
ing the font style of the last word in the conclusion and participants were
required to indicate whether the font of the last word in the previous trial
matched the font of the current trial by responding “same” or “different”. In
the control condition, participants received 64 matching trials in place of
the n-back trials and were required to match the font style of the last word
in premise one with the font style of the last word in the conclusion also by
responding “same” or “different”. Participants in both the Experimental and
Control condition received half “same” and half “different” items. The fol-
lowing five font styles were used in size 18 font: Lucida Handwriting,
Bradley Hand, Algerian, Ravie and Curlz MT.
Again, in both the experimental and control condition, participants were
also presented with belief and logic problems and from trial to trial, would
not know how to respond until presented with response options (see
Table 4).
Procedure
Participants were tested in maximum groups of 4, randomly allocated to
the Control or Experimental condition. Each participant was presented with
192 problems with an optional respite at the half way point: 64 were pre-
sented under belief instruction (believable/unbelievable) 64 under logic
instruction (Valid/Invalid) 64 under n-back instruction in the experimental
condition (same/different) and 64 under matching instruction in the control
condition (same/different). There were 12 practice trials to begin followed
by the full 192 trials which were presented in one of 16 unique orders. The
Table 4. Examples of response options for each instructional cue in both the
Experimental (n-back) and Control (matching) conditions.
Instructional cue Trial one Trial two
Either flamingos are pink or they
are purple Suppose flamingos
are pink Does it follow that
flamingos are Purple?
If the bird is a Dove then it is
orange Suppose the bird is a
Dove Does it follow that the
bird is Orange?
n-back (experimental) n/a (no previous trial) Same or Different
Belief Believable or Unbelievable Believable or Unbelievable
Logic Valid or Invalid Valid or Invalid
Matching (control) Same or Different Same or Different
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n-back instructions emphasised the importance of remembering the charac-
teristics of the previous trial, while the control task restricted the matching
of font style to the current trial. Trials where presented for the same
amount of time and in the same format as Experiment 1 and both accuracy
scores and latencies were recorded for each trial.
Results
Two participants were eliminated from the Experimental condition (N¼ 37)
and four from the Control condition (N¼ 36), for performing below chance
on conflict items. Consistent with Experiment 1, normality was checked on
non-transformed accuracy data, by examining measures of skewness and
kurtosis. The data were then Arcsine transformed to control for celling
effects and improve homogeneity of variance. Prior to transformation, the z
scores across conditions ranged between 6.9 and 8.1 for skewness and
between 6.1 and 10.9 for kurtosis. Post–transformation, the data were more
normally distributed with z-scores ranging between 2.3 and 3.4 for
skewness and 0.2 and 1.18 for kurtosis. Analysis on the latency data were
conducted on correct responses where outliers were eliminated and miss-
ing data accounted for no more than 5.0% of the overall data.
Once again, we present the analyses for the n-back and matching
instruction first, in order to examine the demands of the experimental
Table 5. Average accuracy and latency scores on conflict and no-conflict problems,
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manipulation compared to the control condition, followed by separate anal-
yses on belief and logic instruction.
N-back vs. matching instruction
A 2(Conflict/No-conflict) 2(MP/Disjunctives) 2(Experimental/Control
Condition) mixed design ANOVA was carried out on Arcsine transformed
accuracy data under n-back instruction (Table 5). As in Experiment 1, prob-
lem type refers to whether a conflict or no-conflict problem accompanies
the n-back and matching trials. The results uncovered a marginal main
effect of problem type (Conflict/No-conflict); F(1, 71)¼ 3.827, p¼ .054, g2p ¼
0.051, showing that the n-back and matching trials accompanying conflict
items produced marginally lower scores than no-conflict items (83% vs.
87%). There was main effect of condition; F(2, 71)¼ 17.132, p< .001, g2p ¼
0.194, which confirmed that performance was lower in the experimental
condition than the control condition (80% vs. 90%). This shows that the
requirement to remember the font characteristic in the previous trial signifi-
cantly increased the processing demands and difficulty of the task. There
was also a main effect of complexity (Disjunctives/MP); F(1, 71)¼ 12.712,
p¼ .001, g2p ¼ 0.152, where n-back and matching trials accompanying dis-
junctives produced lower accuracy scores than those accompanying MP
(83% vs. 87%), suggesting that participants found it more challenging to
recall or match font style when the problem was more complex (Table 5).
Contrasting with the Stroop task (Experiment 1), where rapidly accom-
plished MP inferences interfere with the ability to inhibit the colour name,
n-back trials appear to tax distinct executive functions, supposedly those
more demanding of working memory, thus having more impact on infer-
ences requiring additional cognitive effort to resolve (there were no signifi-
cant interactions to report; all p’s> .05).
Response latencies for n-back instruction produced no main effect of
problem type; F(1, 71)¼ 0.144, p¼ .705, g2p ¼ 0.002, but there was a main
effect of condition; F(2, 71)¼ 13.691, p <.001, g2p ¼ 0.162, showing that per-
formance in the control condition was significantly slower than in the
experimental condition (4289ms vs. 3252ms). There was also a main effect
of complexity; F(1, 71)¼ 22.106, p< .001, g2p ¼ 0.237, showing that n-back
and matching trials accompanying disjunctive arguments took longer to
complete than MP arguments (3,991ms-Disjunctives vs. 3552ms-MP). The
interaction between complexity and condition; F(1, 71)¼ 4.934, p¼ 0.030,
g2p ¼ 0.065, indicated that n-back performance on disjunctive judgments
took longer than MP judgments in the control condition (4613ms-
Disjunctives vs. 3967ms-MP) compared to the experimental condition
(3368ms-Disjunctives vs. 3136ms-MP), but the effect size was small. All
remaining interactions were not significant (all p’s> .1).
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Belief and logic instruction
A 2(Belief/Logic) 2(Conflict/No-conflict) 2(MP/Disjunctives) 2(Experimental/
Control Condition) mixed design ANOVA was used for the second set of analy-
ses measuring the effects under belief and logic instruction (Table 6). As in
Experiment 1, we conducted both a subjects and items analysis on accuracy
scores and present both F scores below.
The results produced a main effect of instruction for subjects (Belief/
Logic), F1(1, 71)¼ 22.482, p< .001, g2p ¼ 0.240; and items, F2(1,
120)¼ 13.783, p< .001, g2p ¼ 0.103, with better performance on logic-based
judgments than belief judgments (92% logic vs. 89% belief). There was a
main effect of problem type for subjects (Conflict/No-conflict), F1(1,
71)¼ 37.058, p <.001, g2p ¼ 0.343; and items, F2(1, 120)¼ 30.573, p< .001,
g2p ¼ .203, with conflict items producing lower accuracy scores than no-
conflict items (87% vs. 93%). There was also a main effect of complexity for
subjects (Disjunctives/MP), F1(1, 71)¼ 37.944, p <.001, g2p ¼ 0.348; and
items, F2(1, 120)¼ 16.613, p< .001, g2p ¼ 0.122, with poorer performance on
disjunctives than MP judgments (88% vs. 92%) but no main effect of condi-
tion for subjects analysis, F1(2, 71)¼ 0.909, p ¼.344, g2p ¼ 0.013; signifying
no difference in accuracy scores across conditions (91% experimental vs.
Figure 4. An illustration of the differential impact conflict has on belief and logic
judgments in each condition. Error bars represent the SEM.
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89% control), although this effect was marked as significant in the items
analysis, F2(1, 120)¼ 8.841, p¼ .004, g2p ¼ 0.066.
There was a significant interaction between instruction and problem type
for the subject’s analysis, F1(1, 71)¼ 16.034, p< .001, g2p ¼ .184; and items
analysis, F2(1, 120)¼ 13.900, p< .001, g2p ¼ .104, showing, in line with
Experiment 1, that conflict has less of an impact on conclusion validity (91%
L-conflict vs. 93% L-no-conflict) compared to the believability of a conclusion
(84% B-conflict vs. 94% B-no-conflict Table 6). There was a significant inter-
action between problem type and complexity for subjects, F1(1, 71)¼ 10.255,
p¼ .002, g2p ¼ 0.126; and items, F2(1, 120)¼ 5.104, p¼ .026, g2p ¼ 0.041,
with conflict having less of an impact on disjunctive judgments (87%
Conflict vs. 90% No-conflict) than MP judgments (88% Conflict vs. 97% No-
conflict). There was also an interaction between instruction and complexity
for subjects, F1(1, 71)¼ 27.773, p< .001, g2p ¼ 0.281; and items, F2(1,
120)¼ 9.200, p¼ .003, g2p ¼ 0.017, with a bigger difference in performance
between disjunctives and MP judgments under logic instruction (89% L-
Disjunctives vs. 96% L-MP) than under belief instruction (88% B-Disjunctives
vs. 89% B-MP). Finally, there was a 3-way interaction between instruction,
problem type and condition for subjects, F1(1, 71)¼ 9.035, p¼ .004, g2p ¼
0.113; and items, F2(1, 120)¼ 18.472, p< .001, g2p ¼ 0.133 as demonstrated
in Figure 4.
As in Experiment 1, a follow-up analysis on both conditions confirmed
that the instruction by problem type interaction was present in the experi-
mental condition for subjects, F1(1, 36)¼ 18.727, p< .001, g2p ¼ 0.342; and
items, F2(1, 120)¼ 30.763, p< .001, g2p ¼ 0.204, but absent in the control
condition for both subjects, F1(1, 35)¼ 0.745, p¼ .394, g2p ¼ 0.021; and
items, F2(1, 120)¼ 1.044, p¼ .309, g2p ¼ 0.009. This demonstrates that the
effect of conflict was greater in the experimental condition on belief judg-
ments (82% B-Conflict vs. 95% B-No-conflict) compared to logic judgments
(94% L-Conflict vs. 94% L-No-conflict), whereas in the control condition, the
effect of conflict was similar under both belief (85% B-Conflict vs. 92% B-No-
conflict) and logic instruction (89% L-Conflict vs. 92% L-No-conflict) (Table 6).
A mixed design ANOVA on response latencies replicated most of the
main effects in Experiment 1. Results showed no main effect of instruction
for subjects, F1(1, 71)¼ 0.796, p¼ .375, g2p ¼ 0.011; or items, F2(1, 120)
¼.258, p¼ .612, g2p ¼ 0.002, indicating no significant difference in response
latencies for belief (6195ms) and logic (6320ms) judgments, but there was a
main effect of problem type for subjects, F1(1, 71)¼ 9.097, p¼ .004, g2p ¼
0.114; with a marginal effect in the items analysis, F2(1, 120)¼ 3.167,
p¼ .078, g2p ¼ 0.026, showing conflict items taking longer than no-conflict
items (6428ms vs. 6086ms). There was also a main effect of complexity for
both subjects, F1(1, 71)¼ 6.009, p ¼.017, g2p ¼ 0.078; and items, F2(1,
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120)¼ 6.140, p¼ .015, g2p ¼ 0.049, demonstrating quicker response times to
MP arguments compared to disjunctive arguments (6141ms vs. 6396ms),
but there was no main effect of condition in the subjects analysis, F1(2,
71)¼ 1.217, p¼ .274, g2p ¼ 0.017; whereas the items analysis did produce a
significant effect, F2(1, 120)¼ 16.601, p< .001, g2p ¼ 0.122, with slower
latencies in the experimental condition (6,452ms) compared to the control
condition (6,085ms).
There was a marginal interaction between instruction and condition for
subjects, F1(1, 71)¼ 3.949, p¼ .051, g2p ¼ 0.053; but no interaction in the
item’s analysis, F2(1, 120)¼ 0.060, p¼ .807, g2p < 0.001. There was a signifi-
cant interaction between problem type and complexity for subjects, F1(1,
71)¼ 4.161, p¼ .045, g2p ¼ 0.055; which again was not significant in the
item’s analysis, F2(1, 120)¼ 0.146, p¼ .703, g2p ¼ 0.001. Finally, an inter-
action between instruction and complexity for subjects, F1(1, 71)¼ 18.414, p
<. 001, g2p ¼ 0.206; and items, F2(1, 120)¼ 4.270, p¼ .041, g2p ¼ 0.034,
showed a bigger difference in response times between MP and disjunctive
judgments under logic instruction (6027ms L-MP vs. 6613ms L-Disjunctives)
than under belief instruction (6256ms B-MP vs. 6179ms B-Disjunctives).
Discussion
The principle objective of Experiment 2 was to examine whether the effect
of the Stroop instruction on the accuracy of belief judgments in Experiment
1 could be explained in terms of (1) the inhibitory demands of the Stroop
instruction or (2) the additional demands of including a third instructional
cue. This was achieved by changing the instructional condition from one
that required the inhibition of word naming to one that demanded mem-
ory updating. The memory updating instruction asked participants to
remember the font characteristics of the concluding word of the previous
trial and make a judgment on whether it matched the font in the current
trial. Given that participants were unaware of the specific instruction from
trial to trial, accuracy depended upon continuously updating a memory of
the previous trial font. Consistent with explanation (2), Experiment 2
showed that logic had its biggest impact on belief judgments when an
additional, cognitively demanding, instructional condition was introduced.
The impact was larger in the Experimental condition, compared to the sim-
ple matching judgment required in the Control condition. This suggests
that the increased executive demands created by the extra response alter-
native made it more challenging to generate a logical output.
We would argue that in both experiments 1 and 2, the presence of a
third demanding instructional cue increases cognitive demands by requir-
ing participants to inhibit two competing responses in favour of a target
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response on each trial. The finding suggests that it is not the specific
requirements of the third instruction (Stroop vs. n-back) that results in inter-
ference, but the simple presence of competing response options. Again,
this substantiates a parallel processing model where logical inferences are
available early and require inhibiting in order to allow the more effortful
belief response to complete.
The analysis of belief and logic instruction replicated the main effects
shown in Experiment 1, with belief judgments and conflict problems being
more prone to errors, and more complex disjunctive arguments producing
lower accuracy scores. Furthermore, the presence of a conflict had a larger
effect on the accuracy of belief judgments compared to logic judgments,
supporting previous claims that belief judgments are effortful and draw on
inhibitory resources (Howarth et al. 2016).
Finally, although participants were more accurate in the control condi-
tion, they also took significantly longer to respond. One possible explan-
ation of this finding is that in the n-back condition participants were
required to consistently keep an active representation of the last word in
mind from trial to trial, whereas with the matching task there was no active
representation. Instead participants were required to re-inspect the first
premise in order to make a match with the last word in the concluding
statement. This would have required an additional saccade and therefore
took longer to complete.
General discussion
In this article, we examined the impact of introducing a third competing
instructional condition on participants’ ability to accurately judge the valid-
ity or the believability of a conclusion. Previous research has shown that
belief-logic conflict has a greater influence on belief judgments than logic
judgments (Handley et al., 2011; Howarth et al., 2016). One interpretation of
this finding is that a logical response is available early and must be inhib-
ited in order to generate a slower response based upon underlying beliefs.
The presence of a third cognitively demanding instructional condition was
predicted to impact more upon effortful belief judgments than logic judg-
ments. This effect was present in both experiments irrespective of whether
the executive demands of the additional instruction depended upon the
inhibition of word naming or the updating of working memory.
Our main focus was to explore the function of inhibition on reasoning
under conflict in relation to the Handley and Trippas (2015) parallel process-
ing model (Figure 1). The findings lend support to this model and suggest
that belief judgments on this task are more effortful than logic judgments;
hence the logical status of a conclusion interferes more with belief
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responses under conflict. The implication is that some logic-based reason-
ing resembles an intuitive type-1 process, and according to the model must
be inhibited in favour of a more deliberative belief-based output.
Introducing a third instructional condition, in the form of colour-naming or
memory updating, impacted on the ability to inhibit the early completion
of a logical response. In other words, increasing the demands on executive
resources enhanced the impact of logic on effortful belief judgments by
burdening the resources required to inhibit intuitive logic. Importantly, the
nature of this additional instructional cue had little differential effect on the
overall impact of conflict.
There was, however, an inconsistency between the accuracy and latency
data. While the accuracy data support the idea that belief judgments
require effortful processing, the latency data suggests that increasing the
number of competing responses has a bigger impact on the time it takes
to reason on the basis of logic (Experiment 2) specifically logic-conflict
items (Experiment 1) more so than those under belief instruction. We would
argue that the discrepancy between the accuracy and latency data corrobo-
rates there being qualitative differences between logical outputs. In line
with recent work (Bago & De Neys, 2017; Newman et al., 2017), we would
argue that there are “two routes” to a logical solution; an intuitive route
and a deliberative route. The intuitive route is a type-1 process, which com-
pletes outside explicit awareness but is sensitive to the logical structure of
a problem. This automatic logical output is probably accompanied by a
Feeling of Rightness (Thompson, Prowse, Turner, & Pennycook, 2011) based
on conceptual fluency (Morsanyi & Handley, 2012), or intuitive strength
(Bago & De Neys, 2017), which provides the reasoner with an intuitive
logical cue. The impact of a conflicting logical response on belief judgments
may be interpreted as a type-1/type-2 conflict requiring the inhibition of
this intuitive logical cue in order to reason according to beliefs. The cue,
however, may not be sufficient to generate a logical response. When
instructed to reason logically, a second deliberative route must be engaged,
which involves effortful type-2 processing that depends upon the explicit
integration of premise information and model construction, triggered in
parallel to a belief-based output. This would explain the impact of a sec-
ondary task on logic judgments reported by Howarth et al. (2016), where
extracting the underlying structure of an argument when instructed to rea-
son logically, was impacted on by requirement to generate random num-
bers (Random Number Generation task) alongside the reasoning task. When
additional response alternatives make the task more cognitively demanding
(Experiments 1 and 2) inhibition of the initial logical output becomes more
challenging when instructed to reason on the basis of beliefs, and more
time consuming when integrating premise information under logic
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instruction. However, due to the relatively simple nature of the conditional
problems the presence of an additional instructional condition has less
impact on logic accuracy.
Recent work by Newman, Gibb and Thompson (2017) using challenging
response deadlines provides evidence consistent with this account. They
showed evidence of sensitivity to logical structure under response deadline
and under free responding consistent with a dual route to logical judg-
ments (rule-based). Interestingly, they also showed sensitivity to counterex-
ample availability under speeded task suggesting that associative beliefs
were available through type-1 processing, a finding consistent with dual
route accounts of reasoning (Markovits, Brisson, de Chantal, & Thompson,
2017). Their findings suggest that reasoners are intuitively sensitive to
logical and probabilistic information (Route 1) but when given more time
to reflect on their responses, the ability to discriminate between valid and
invalid inferences improves, as evidence for slower, rule-based processing
(Route 2).
Our findings are consistent with dual routes to a logical solution, but we
would argue that there is limited evidence in our data to support dual
routes to a belief-based response. On the contrary, the uni-directional
impact of logic on belief judgments, particularly under conditions of add-
itional executive demands, suggests that in this paradigm beliefs operate at
a type-2 level. In both Experiments 1 and 2, there was no effect of beliefs
on logic judgments in the experimental conditions and if anything, logical
performance on conflict problems was marginally improved. This observa-
tion is consistent with evidence of improved logical performance in other
paradigms, under cognitive load, such as scalar implicature (De Neys &
Schaeken, 2007), or most recently shown with base rate and syllogistic rea-
soning problems where logical responding increases under load and
response deadline (Bago & De-Neys, 2017).
Is it possible that the belief judgments in these studies are more difficult
because of the way in which the problems were structured? Consider for
example one of the MP problems:
If the bird is a Dove then it is orange
Suppose the bird is a Dove
Does it follow that the bird is orange?
As a reviewer pointed out, one cannot make a judgment concerning the
believability of the conclusion with reference to the conclusion alone. In
order to determine its believability, one also needs to know that the bird
being referred to is a Dove, which can only be determined with reference
to the second premise also. So, like logical judgments, there is some
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integration of premise information required to generate a response. We do
not think that this problem feature can uniquely explain why belief judg-
ments are more effortful on this task than logic judgments for three rea-
sons. Firstly, whilst belief judgments on these problem types require
reference to one premise and a conclusion, logic judgments require signifi-
cant additional processing through the integration of both presented prem-
ises. Therefore, on the basis of premise integration, one would expect belief
judgments to be simpler. Secondly, if we consider the disjunctive argu-
ments employed (Tables 1 and 4), in all cases the belief judgment can be
made with reference only to the concluding sentence. There is no evidence
that the greater difficulty of belief judgments is confined to the MP argu-
ments. Thirdly, there is evidence from previous research (Handley et al.,
2011; Study 4) that logic impacts upon belief judgments on simple MP
problems, where conclusion believability is manipulated entirely independ-
ent of belief in the major premise through the use of abstract mid-
dle terms.
Our findings fit well with a parallel competitive dual process model,
however could a continuous rather than dichotomous scale of complexity
account for our data? Keren and Schul’s (2009) uni-model offers a single
evaluative system to distinguish between the structure of the argument or
knowledge of its content as distinct external criteria and alternative
responses come in and out of awareness continuously when reasoning.
This shift between mental states to solve different problems, for example,
will depend on features such level of control, awareness and time. The way
these features join depends on the goal and the environmental limitations.
Similarly, Kruglanski and Gigerenzer (2011) reject the dual process claims of
qualitatively distinct processing systems underlying responses to reasoning
and judgment tasks. Instead they suggest that both intuitive and delibera-
tive judgments rely on the application of rules that are activated by task
features and environmental cues. The nature of the rules that are applied
will be determined by memory capacity, attentional demands and eco-
logical fit.
In some ways, Keren and Schul’s uni-model has aspects in common with
the parallel competitive theory, in that it allows for the parallel activation of
competing cues to a problem solution. However, neither this account nor
Kruglanski and Gigerenzer’s position supports a qualitative difference
between type-1 and type-2 responses to reasoning tasks. We would argue
that the data in this article and elsewhere provide strong evidence, at the
very least, of qualitatively distinct processes underlying logical responding
to reasoning tasks. As discussed earlier, the findings here show an inform-
ative dissociation between the accuracy and latency data, suggesting an
intuitive sensitivity to logical structure which impacts on the accuracy of
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belief judgments, coupled with more deliberative and time dependent
responding under logical instruction. While this is not decisive evidence of
a qualitative distinction, other findings suggest a clear dissociation between
explicit and intuitive logical sensitivity. For example, Morsanyi and Handley
(2012) showed that participants “liked” sentences that logically followed
from the sentences that preceded them more than those that did not.
Crucially this effect was uninfluenced by participants cognitive capacity,
mindset or superficial problem structures, features that did influence expli-
cit reasoning judgments. We have recently shown that validity not only
influences how much participants like a presented statement, but also their
perceptual judgments concerning its brightness, a feature completely dis-
connected from its logical validity (Trippas, Handley, Verde & Morsanyi,
2016). It has been suggested that this effect arises because of a feeling of
fluency arising from reading a series of logically coherent sentences that in
turn generates a feeling of positive affect which is then misattributed to
the perceptual features of the stimuli. These findings, coupled with evi-
dence of early detection of logical validity under rapid responding condi-
tions (Bago & De Neys, 2017; Newman et al., 2017), strongly suggest that
there are qualitatively distinct processes underlying sensitivity to
logical structure.
Conclusion
With respect to traditional Default Interventionist (DI) dual process accounts
of reasoning (see Evans & Stanovich, 2013), the data presented here does
not fit well for two key reasons; (1) The findings strongly suggest type-2
processing underpins belief-based judgments and (2) simple arguments
appear to cue an intuitive logical response, perhaps accompanied by a feel-
ing of rightness associated with the validity of the argument. Thus, our data
fit better with a model where both the logical structure of an argument
and relevant knowledge are processed simultaneously and conflict is
explained in terms of the initiation of competing cues to a solution. The dir-
ection of conflict, however, will depend on the complexity of the problem,
the instructions delivered and the ability to draw on the suitable executive
resources for type-2 processing. With simple logical arguments of the kind
used here, an intuitive logical response is available early and must be inhib-
ited in order to explicitly generate a response based on belief. Withholding
an available logical response is effortful and, as our findings show, increas-
ing cognitive demands significantly reduces participants’ capacity to do so.
In contrast, as previous work has shown, on more complex arguments such
as syllogisms, a belief-based response may complete first, hence impacting
on logic-based reasoning (Trippas, Thompson & Handley, 2017).
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While the evidence of dual routes to a logical solution is consistent with
the parallel processing model, the model also makes clear predictions con-
cerning the impact of complexity, not only on logic judgments, but also on
judgments of belief. Future research could usefully focus on the manipula-
tion of the complexity of belief judgment by using materials that vary in
terms of degree of belief and examine the impact on logic-based reasoning
as well as measuring how logical processing compromises beliefs. One
might expect that with beliefs that are more complex, to evaluate the
impact of conflicting logical structure will be greater. Furthermore, research
on the development of inhibition and its impact on reasoning could be
valuable. To date research on inhibition has shown that its capacity produ-
ces a curvilinear age trend. The ability to resist prepotent responses tends
to improve from childhood to adolescence and declines again in later life
(Bedard et al., 2002; Christ, White, Mandernach & Keys, 2001). De Neys and
Van Geldor (2009) demonstrated with syllogistic reasoning, that when belief
and logic conflict, performance is determined by a person’s aptitude for
inhibiting a response. Therefore, one would expect no effect of conflict if
inhibition resources were underdeveloped (in young children) or limited in
any way.
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